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Wildland Fire Use: Managing for a Fire-Smart Landscape
The promise of wildland fire use (WFU) is that, over time,
the fires will play a more natural role, creating a jigsaw-puzzle pattern
of burned and regrowing patches over a landscape and gradually moving it
closer to the stand structure and species composition that prevailed

National Park Service

before fire exclusion became the policy.

The Hoover Fire—A WFU fire in Yosemite National Park, 2001.
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On a damp June day in 1994, lightning ignited
a small forest fire in Glacier National Park. The fire,
dubbed the Howling Fire after the resident wolves,
stayed within about an acre for 6 weeks. Then in late
July it roared to life, spreading to more than 2,000
acres. Some people, including the editors of several
area newspapers, thought it should be immediately
suppressed. But the superintendent, with the help of
fire behavior experts, decided the fire was probably not
a threat to human life or property. With his blessing,
The Bad Luck WFU fire, Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness, 1972.
it was allowed to burn, carefully monitored, until the
rains came 4 months later.
The Howling Fire represented a successful test
objectives that have been identified for it, and at the
of what was then called “prescribed natural fire”—
same time protect people, property, and key resources.
proving that managing a fire for ecosystem benefits
WFU is not the same as prescribed fire (defined as
could work even in forest types characterized by large,
manager-ignited fire), although its effects may be
stand-replacing fire. “It showed scientists and Park
similar. The term “wildland fire use” refers only to
Service managers that the policy was valid,” says
fires ignited by lightning, managed so that they burn in
Jan van Wagtendonk, a fire ecologist with the U.S.
predesignated areas under a strict set of prescriptions.
Geological Survey at Yosemite National Park.
“We like to emphasize that we are not just ‘letting
The recent, intense wildfire seasons of the past
fires burn,’” says Tim Sexton, a Forest Service fire
few years seem to repeat a hard-earned lesson: trying
ecologist who’s in charge of both WFU and prescribed
to keep fire out of landscapes that thrive on fire is
fire across the Nation’s 200 million acres (about 80.9
expensive, sometimes tragic, and ultimately futile.
million hectares) of Forest Service lands. “Rather,
“It’s like the old saying, ‘You can pay me now, or
we are actively managing fires—protecting values at
you can pay me later,’” says Tom Nichols, chief of
risk while achieving resource benefits in those places
the National Park Service’s fire and aviation division.
where fire has a positive effect.”
“When California burst into flames [in the summer of
The promise of WFU is that, over time, the fires
2008], I told folks, ‘Well, this is the pay-me-later part.’
will play a more natural role, creating a jigsaw-puzzle
You get blasted with thousands of [lightning] strikes,
pattern of burned and regrowing patches over a
in fuels that have been untreated for years and years,
landscape and gradually moving it closer to the stand
and now everything is on fire.”
structure and species composition that prevailed before
For nearly a century, suppression has been the
fire exclusion became the policy. In the process, the
main strategy for dealing with wildfire on the Nation’s
fires consume built-up fuels, making the landscape less
public lands. The resulting accumulation of flammable
susceptible to a more-severe fire later.
biomass now hangs over managers’ heads like an
“What’s happening is that these past fires are
unpaid bill. The Howling Fire was a showcase for
regulating the growth of future fires, so that fire
a different way of handling fire, one that has been
behavior becomes much more benign,” says Bob
tested and refined on national parks and wilderness
Mutch, a fire researcher who helped develop the
areas for nearly 40 years now. First
Forest Service’s first WFU program.
termed “prescribed natural fire,” the
“When a new fire starts, it burns into
strategy now is called “wildland fire
old fires and becomes self-regulating.”
The strategy now
use for resource benefits,” commonly
The landscape, he says, becomes
is called
abbreviated to WFU.
what fire ecologist Penny Morgan
“wildland fire use for
In its simplest essence, WFU
has called “fire-smart.” Says Mutch:
resource benefits,”
means managing lightning-caused
“I think that’s a most appropriate
fires as they burn naturally instead of
commonly
description. The landscape adapts [to
putting them out. Managers shape,
repeated WFU fires] in such a way that
abbreviated
nudge, and corral the fire to accomplish
smart things happen—smart for the
to WFU.
the ecological and fuel-reduction
ecosystem and smart for society.”
2
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started letting fires burn in higher elevations. “We got to
fly the area, see a new fire they’d just detected,” says
Mutch. “The matter-of-fact way that the new fire was
allowed to burn rather than being suppressed was a
revealing opportunity for us.”

Bob Mutch helped pioneer the Forest Service’s
first WFU program in Montana’s Selway-Bitterroot
Wilderness. The Wilderness Act of 1964, called for
managing wilderness areas for their natural qualities,
says Mutch, “but one of the most unnatural acts
we’d been committing in the wild all these years was
suppression of fire.”

The following summer, the five men hiked the 9 miles
from Paradise Guard Station to Cooper’s Flat and
pitched their tents. They built a campfire and talked late
into the night about how to carry off “this radical idea of
letting nature do its thing,” says Mutch.

In the late 1960s, the National Park Service was
experimenting with letting fire play its natural role. But
no one in the Forest Service had tried it. Bud Moore,
then director of fire for the Forest Service’s Northern
Region, and Bill Worf, regional director of wilderness
and recreation, got funding from the national Forest
Service office for a pilot project. Moore and Worf
approached Orville Daniels, forest supervisor on the
Bitterroot, and enlisted his enthusiastic support.

The team spent the next year thoroughly analyzing the
study area—sampling vegetation, collecting evidence of
fire history, studying records of past fires, and charting
the effects of fire exclusion. By the summer of 1972,
their plan was complete. Daniels and Mutch traveled
to Washington, DC, and presented it to Forest Service
Chief John McGuire, who approved it on the spot.
“Three weeks later I was back in the White Cap,” says
Mutch, “and an aerial patrol detected a brand-new fire
in Bad Luck Creek. I did the initial assessment, and the
decision was made to allow it to burn.” The Bad Luck
fire lasted 4 days and burned less than one-fourth of
an acre, but in the following year there was a more
significant incident. A prescribed natural fire in the Fitz
Creek drainage burned about 1,600 acres—more than
had been burned by all the previous fires of record in the
Whitecap drainage.

The men chose 100 square miles of the Whitecap Creek
drainage for their study area. Whitecap Creek was both
remote and diverse, representing a good cross section
of topography and forest types. Dave Aldrich, a forester
from Idaho, was chosen to lead the project. Mutch, a fire
scientist from the Missoula Fire Sciences Laboratory,
would be the team’s co-leader and researcher.
In August of 1970, Aldrich and Mutch visited SequoiaKings Canyon National Park, where managers had

The Fitz Creek fire lasted 43 days and attracted national
media attention. It also escaped the bounds of the
management area, “which caused some consternation,”
Mutch recalls. The escaped portion of the fire was
suppressed after burning an additional 1,600 acres
without causing undue damage. The Forest Service’s
new prescribed natural fire policy had passed its first
test.

B. Moore

In the summer of 2001, Mutch met Moore, Worf,
Daniels, and Aldrich for a 30-year reunion hike to
Cooper’s Flat. Back at Paradise, they held a public
anniversary celebration for an experiment that is proving
to have far-reaching consequences for America’s public
forests.

Bob Mutch and Dave Aldrich hiking the Whitecap Creek
drainage in 1970.

WFU is increasingly being applied to lands with
other, non-wilderness objectives, including wildlife,
timber, watershed, and recreation. There is much
uncertainty surrounding its use, especially in these
more-developed landscapes. Nearly a decade of JFSPsupported science is helping to reduce some of that
uncertainty.

WFU is playing an increasingly important role in
restoring natural fire to fire-prone ecosystems, says
van Wagtendonk. “As a fire ecologist, I’m interested in
seeing fire play its ecological role wherever possible.”
In particular, wildernesses and parks, where the goal
is to restore and maintain natural ecological processes,
are areas where fire can be allowed, he says, “and it
should be.” Trying to exclude fire from these forests,
he adds, is “sort of like trying to remove rain.”
3
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and Kings Canyon, Bandelier, Yosemite, Saguaro, and
Grand Teton National Parks and the Selway-Bitterroot,
Bob Marshall, Frank Church-River of No Return,
Bridger-Teton, and Gila-Aldo Leopold wildernesses.
Some national forests also have extended their WFU
programs to lands outside wilderness areas; these
include the Bitterroot, Boise, Gallatin, Gila, and
Payette National Forests. Most Montana national
forests and all those in Utah allow WFU across their
whole acreage with minor exceptions, Sexton says.
In the eastern United States, the Great Smoky
Mountains and Everglades National Parks have
active WFU programs, as do the Ouachita and
George Washington National Forests. More than half
the national forest acreage in the Forest Service’s
Southern Region is available for WFU, according to
Sexton. Other Federal agencies that practice WFU
are the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Bureau of Land
Management, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.

Rethinking suppression
The Federal Wildland Management Policy now
directs managers to “allow lightning-caused fires to
play, as nearly as possible, their natural ecological
role in wilderness.” Accordingly, WFU programs have
been developed and expanded in many national parks
and Forest Service wilderness areas.
Most of the natural ignitions on national forest
wilderness lands are still suppressed, for a complex
of operational and cultural reasons. Nevertheless,
national forest managers of both wilderness and nonwilderness lands are working to increase WFU’s use.
“For example, the Krassell Ranger District, on the
Payette National Forest, manages more than half of
the lightning ignitions as WFU fires,” says Sexton.
“Similarly, the West Fork District of the Bitterroot
National Forest also dominantly manages lightning
ignitions as WFU.”
National forests and national parks that have
developed successful WFU programs include Sequoia

The early 1960s produced the first glimmerings of
an ecosystem-management philosophy for parks
and wilderness areas. The Park Service was having
difficulties with wildlife management, and the Secretary
of the Interior convened a committee to look into the
problem. The committee’s chairman was Starker
Leopold, son of Aldo Leopold. The Leopold Report,
released in 1963, went beyond the wildlife problems
to recommend that national parks be managed as
ecosystems. In 1968, the Park Service changed its fire
policy accordingly: fires were to be allowed to burn as
long as they were likely to achieve predefined objectives
and could be contained if necessary.

Early Alternatives to Suppression
A suppress-all-fires policy was adopted by the fledgling
Forest Service in 1910 after an unusually severe
fire season, and it was subsequently adopted by
the National Park Service. Other approaches were
proposed as early as 1916, when Roy Headley, a Forest
Service district forester in California, began letting lowintensity fires burn in remote areas of national forest
lands as long as they didn’t threaten valuable timber. In
1934, Headley, then chief of Forest Service fire control,
proposed withholding some suppression resources from
back-country fires. Wilderness advocates Bob Marshall
and Aldo Leopold supported the proposal, but it was
turned down.

Programs to manage natural fire sprang up almost
immediately at Sequoia and Kings Canyon National
Parks, Saguaro National Monument (today a national
park), and Yosemite National Park. In the Forest
Service, WFU programs began in the
Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness on the
Bitterroot National Forest and the
Gila Wilderness in New Mexico.
These programs, then known as
“prescribed natural fire,” were
very successful, and in 1978
the Forest Service mitigated
its full-suppression policy
to accommodate a new one
encouraging wildland fire use,
carefully prescribed.

USDA FS

Later, in 1950, the Park Service approved a research
area in a remote, high-elevation area of Sequoia
National Park that would be allowed to burn if it caught
fire. The approval was for the one case only and was
explicitly not to be taken as a policy change. At
Yosemite National Park, assistant chief ranger
George Briggs recommended allowing fires
to burn in high-elevation areas once it was
determined that sparse fuel and natural fire
breaks would probably stop them before
they did any damage. All these proposals
rested on economic arguments, but Briggs’s
proposal also made an ecological case for letting
wildfires burn.

Grasses recolonize a burned slope in the Bob Marshall Wilderness.
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benefits: a rejuvenated forest community, enhanced
wildlife habitat, and reduced risk from a really big fire.
“I hear people say after a fire, ‘we lost it all,’” Pence
says. “But it’s not lost; it’s just changed.”

Chainsaw surgery
The notion of letting a fire burn itself out is simple
in concept but complicated in execution. Wildfire is,
by definition, wild—barely subject to human control.
Even with the best reconnaissance and the latest
planning tools, a manager can never know for sure that
a WFU fire will burn as expected.
“It’s chainsaw surgery,” says Guy Pence, fire staff
officer on the Boise National Forest. “I can’t draw a
line and promise the fire will stay on this side. I’m
dependent on weather: wind, temperature, humidity.”
He can do a pretty good job of forecasting and
predicting, he says. “But it’s not scalpel surgery.”
WFU requires extensive advance planning. First,
the management plan for a park or forest—the publicly
reviewed, NEPA-compliant document that governs
all management activities for a span of years—has to
permit WFU. Then the fire management plan—the
execution document—has to spell out a detailed
process for managing a WFU fire. Managers face a
long checklist of considerations: Is it the right season
of the year? Is the ignition in the right place on the
forest? Are the winds likely to remain favorable? Are
there natural barriers like talus slopes that will check
the fire? Is the fire likely to burn into territory where it
must be suppressed, or to escape the area altogether?
Will it send large quantities of smoke into neighboring
communities? If it gets out of hand, are there enough
firefighters to fight it safely? Can people live with the
blaze, the smoke, and the uncertainty for weeks or
months, until the fall rains come?
Nerves of steel may not be strictly required,
but they help. Many forest supervisors and park
superintendents are understandably uncomfortable
with making a “go” decision on a WFU fire. The
ecological and fuel-reduction benefits won’t accrue
until later, but the risks are immediate—risk of the
fire’s escape, risk of heavy smoke, of accusations of
mismanagement, of official disapproval and public
wrath. “Nobody wants to be the supervisor on the
next Yellowstone,” says Pence—referring to the 1988
wildfire blowup that thrust WFU policy (then known
as “prescribed natural fire”) into national headlines.
“It’s tricky business,” he says. “You get a hollow
feeling in the pit of your stomach.”
Pence, who started his career as a firefighter, is one
of a growing number of advocates of implementing
WFU across the entire Federal forest system. In his
younger days, he says, “I suppressed many fires that
probably didn’t need to be suppressed.” He has been
managing fires for 40 years, long enough to see the

Yellowstone: Wildland Fire Reaffirmed
WFU has had setbacks, the most notorious being
the Yellowstone fires of 1988. Based on a plan
written in 1972, Yellowstone National Park allowed
several lightning fires to burn in a remote corner
of the park in late June. At the same time, Forest
Service managers of the Absaroka-Beartooth
Wilderness just north of Yellowstone were
monitoring the Storm Creek Fire.
By the end of July, unusually dry conditions coupled
with high winds convinced managers of both
agencies to suppress all fires that were currently
burning as well as all new starts. Human-caused
fires from outside of the park added to the problem.
In fact, the North Fork fire, which threatened Old
Faithful Village, was started by a woodcutter’s
chainsaw on the adjacent Targhee National Forest.
Of the nine major fires that burned almost 1.4
million acres, six were ignited outside the park
and four were human-caused. Accusations of
irresponsible management were common, and the
National Park Service was left with a serious public
relations problem.

BLM/NOFA Collection

Nevertheless, the team that reviewed the
Yellowstone incident reaffirmed the ecological
value of allowing fire and recommended several
measures to strengthen fire management. A few
years after Yellowstone, it was plain even to the
untrained eye that the park’s landscape had been
invigorated and renewed. The ecological benefits
of WFU in fire-adapted landscapes have been
consistently confirmed.

Lightning strike.

5

Fire Science Digest

Issue 4

JANUARY 2009

Catching up with the biomass

USDA FS

Between 1998 and 2006, more than 1.4 million
acres (about 579,000 hectares) have burned in WFU
fires on lands managed by all five of the Federal
agencies with WFU programs. The Forest Service
leads in both numbers of fires (1,854) and area burned
(950,211 acres; 384,538 hectares) during that period.
The tally for 2008 so far is 133 fires and about 172,000
acres (69,606 hectares) burned, according to Sexton.
Some scientists and managers worry that WFU
isn’t being applied as widely as it needs to be. Even
the most successful WFU programs, they say, are not
working fast enough to restore the fire patterns that
prevailed before European-American settlement. For
example, as of 2000, only one in five of the 400 Forest
Service-managed wilderness areas in the lower 48
states permitted WFU in its fire management plan. A
more recent survey of wilderness managers revealed
that only one-fourth of the lightning-caused fires on
their lands between 2002 and 2004 occurred in areas
that had been approved for WFU. Of those ignitions,
only 40 percent were actually managed as WFU fires.
In short, many acres that could benefit from WFU are
not yet covered by a WFU program, and even within
those areas, most fires are still suppressed.
Sexton argues for a more positive outlook. “The
number of fires is not so meaningful as area burned,”
he says. “The total area of Forest Service lands where
WFU is permitted has increased by more than 20
million acres since 2000. Yes, there’s still room for
improvement—but we are making progress.”

The Papoose WFU fire on the Payette National Forest in
Idaho, 2007.

negative reactions to smoke or the risk of damage to
private property).
The managers also suggested ways the Forest
Service could achieve more “go” decisions: supporting
WFU at all levels of the organization, giving managers
greater flexibility for managing WFU in wilderness,
increasing awareness of the national directive to
manage ignitions as WFU, increasing land areas
available to WFU, and increasing the organization’s
knowledge about WFU.
Scientists are working hard to add to that body
of knowledge. Thanks to many studies funded and
disseminated by the JFSP, managers now have a
better understanding of what a wildfire can do, what
it is likely to do, and what the odds are that it will
do something unmanageable. “Those managers
whom we might characterize as ‘risk-averse,’” says
Sexton, “might not be risk-averse if they have a better
understanding of what the real versus perceived
risks are. JFSP research is providing better ways of
assessing those risks. That’s the real payoff of JFSP
work.”

Barriers and facilitators
Some of the reasons managers might hesitate to
make a “go” decision were revealed in a recent survey
of National Forest wilderness fire managers. The
study was led by then-graduate student Dustin Doane,
a Forest Service smokejumper, with the help of Jay
O’Laughlin, Penny Morgan, and Carol Miller.
Building on earlier, JFSP-supported work by
Carol Miller and Peter Landres, Doane and his
colleagues identified a host of factors that influence
a “go/no go” decision. These include constraints
within the organizational culture (for example, a
strong bias toward suppression), political boundaries
(for example, concern that the fire would burn too
close to neighboring lands), organizational capacity
(lack of time and resources to plan for WFU), policy
directives (for example, a blanket suppression order at
the regional level), and public perceptions (potential

WFU works
First of all, much observation and study over the
35-year history of WFU have confirmed its ecological
benefits. WFU is clearly doing what it is supposed to
do: restoring fire as a natural process and mitigating
hazardous fire conditions resulting from past fire
exclusion.
For example, a case study conducted by Matt
Rollins of the Forest Service and Penelope Morgan
and graduate student Zack Holden of the University
of Idaho as part of a comprehensive JFSP research
6
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project (JFSP 01-1-1-06) assessed the
of successive naturally occurring
Repeated WFU fires
effects of 30 years of wildland fire use
fires in the Illilouette Creek Basin in
have
restored
programs on the 230,800 acres (about
Yosemite National Park. They found
forest resilience.
93,401 hectares) Gila Wilderness in
that fire “can exhibit self-limiting
New Mexico and the 29,500 acres
characteristics,” meaning that as
(about 11,938 hectares) Saguaro
fire consumes fuel over time, fireWilderness in Arizona. The timing and extent of fires
induced effects of subsequent fires are lessened. This
in the ponderosa pinedominated forests of these two
information helps fire managers better anticipate the
wilderness areas have been richly documented since
effects of allowing fires to burn and improves their
early in the 20th century. Rollins, Morgan, and Holden
ability to manage WFU programs.
sampled in areas burned 0, 1, 2, or 3 or more times in
Morgan, Holden, and the others did look at
25 years, collecting data on age, size, and height of
the implications of severe fires for fish in another
trees and structure and composition of forest stands.
JFSP-funded study on the Gila Wilderness
They found that, in general, repeated WFU fires
(JFSP 05-2-1-101), which examined the effects of
since 1972 have reduced the density of small-diameter
WFU fires on imperiled Gila chub and trout species
trees without significantly affecting the density of
in the Gila River and its tributaries. Fish biologists
larger trees. In other words, the WFU fires have tended
were concerned that the fires were causing landscape
to push the forest toward a condition closer to that of
changes that might threaten the fish. They needed a
the ponderosa pine forests of pre-fire exclusion days,
map of areas where fires, if they occurred, were likely
with forests of many large trees and snags and some
to burn the most severely.
small trees and logs.
Morgan and her colleagues used pre- and postAlong with the structural changes has come an
fire satellite images and field data to map fire severity,
increase in the resilience of these forests to severe
and then developed statistical models of where fires
fire. “Ponderosa pine forests in the Gila Wilderness
had burned severely over the last 20 years. They then
and Saguaro Wilderness are structurally diverse
worked with Forest Service researchers to modify a
and resistant to fires burning during the natural fire
decision support tool developed earlier for the Boise
season,” say the authors in a 2007 article in the journal
River drainage (with JFSP support) by Forest Service
Fire Ecology, “suggesting that repeated WFU fires
researchers. “We adapted it to the Gila Wilderness to
have restored forest resilience to fire.” Says coauthor
help managers identify areas where the likelihood of
Penny Morgan: “Not just big trees survived, but there
severe fires overlapped areas where the vulnerable fish
populations were,” says Morgan. Also included was
were lots of logs, small trees, and spatial variability. It
a component to help identify where landslides were
looked beautiful, and I assume such a diverse structure
most likely to occur and where channel morphology
would be useful to wildlife, although our study didn’t
made fish populations particularly vulnerable. The
look at that aspect.”
researchers delivered the tool to Gila managers in the
JFSP-supported research such as this offers
fall of 2008.
valuable guidance to fire managers in making a WFU
decision, says Dave Bartlett, fire management officer
on the Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks.
“Research is the basis of our decision process,” says
Bartlett. “We use what we know about the fire return
interval along with local inputs like slope, aspect,
terrain, and so on, to analyze our landscape and
determine why we should burn and what the priority
for treating a given area is.” Like all agencies with
WFU programs, Sequoia and Kings Canyon parks
have a research officer, fire ecologist Tony Caprio,
who sees to it that management decisions are informed
by the latest research. “He’s our conduit for the
science,” says Bartlett.
Recently published results from a JFSP study
(JFSP 01-1-1-06) illustrate the long-term benefits of
Another WFU fire in the Sequoia National Forest,
the Broder-Beck fire.
WFU. In this study, the authors examined the effects
7
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Defining the target

USDA FS

If the goal is to restore natural fire patterns,
managers need to know what those patterns looked
like. Studies of fire scars on trees are widely used to
reconstruct the occurrence and extent of historical fire
regimes; these reconstructions suggest the forest’s
structural, species-composition, and successional
patterns through time. However, because wildfire is
so variable in its effects, fire-scar sampling yields an
incomplete record, and so it’s uncertain how much can
be inferred from a given set of samples.
In another study within the comprehensive project
mentioned previously (JFSP 01-1-1-06), graduate
student Brandon Collins and and Scott Stephens of the
University of California at Berkeley sampled fire scars
in two California national parks where WFU has been
practiced since 1973. They looked at Illilouette Creek
basin in Yosemite National Park and Sugarloaf Creek
basin in Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Park.
They calculated the fire rotation and extent suggested
by the fire scars and compared them to known data
from the WFU fires, derived from fire atlases and
satellite images of burn severity.
In most cases, they found, the fire-scar based
estimates greatly underestimated the actual extent of
the fire. In other words, the actual fire was larger than
the fire-scar sample said it was, often much larger.
On the other hand, some fires didn’t show up in the
fire-scar record at all. What this means for managers
is that tree-ring studies tell only a partial story about
fire extent or size, and the story may be less reliable
in forest types characterized by short burn intervals.
Because the data are still inconsistent, it’s not time
to propose a correction factor, say the researchers.
“Rather, we intend for this study to serve as an
initial step in attempting to meaningfully understand
uncertainty in fire-scar based reconstructions.”

The August 2006 Tamarack WFU fire in the Sequoia National Forest.

burning with WFU in terms of the land management
objectives,” she says, “and to determine if there’s a
threshold where there’s too much fire.”
Miller chose a modeling tool called TELSA (Tool
for Exploratory Landscape Scenario Analysis), which
is a “state-and-transition” type of fire succession
model—that is, it illustrates how patches of vegetation
on the landscape move from one successional state
to the next across space and time. She modeled the
effects of five different fire regimes on forest structure
and composition. The first fire regime was based on
the actual fire record for the landscape from 1908 to
2003. The next four represented successive increases
in the frequency of fires and the frequency of largefire years. Effects of the simulated fires were folded
into subsequent simulation runs, so that the modeling
simulated the cumulative effects of fires across the
landscape over 1,000 years.
Miller found that the scenarios with more fires
resulted in a younger forest characterized by earlier
successional stages. She also found that these younger
forests were much more variable in structure and
composition than management plans called for. The
middle fire-regime, scenario 3, turned out to produce
the landscape conditions that were closest to those
desired (even though these too showed a lot of
variation from desired conditions from time to time).
Assessing progress
On the other hand, scenario 5, with an average
33-year fire rotation, ended up moving the landscape
Managers also need to know whether their
away from desired future conditions,
burning program is actually moving
probably because it provided too much
the forest closer to the desired
The TELSA simulation
fire.
condition. In another JFSP-funded
offers a way for
All models necessarily simplify
study (JFSP 03-1-1-07), Carol Miller,
managers
to
refine
real-life
processes. Even so, the
a fire ecologist at the Aldo Leopold
TELSA simulation offers a way for
their assessment of
Wilderness Research Institute in
managers to refine their assessment
Missoula, computer-simulated five
how much
of how much fire is enough to meet
fire regimes on the Boise National
fire is enough
their goals. “In wilderness areas and
Forest. “My goal was to evaluate
to meet their goals.
parks,” Miller writes, “there has been
the consequences of increasing
8
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little discussion about how much fire
effects of fire. These effects are
The enhanced maps
is appropriate, probably because any
determined from the expected severity
help
managers
and all lightning-ignited fire is viewed
of the fire and the desired future
identify those
as being commensurate with land
condition for the landscape in question.
management goals.” Miller’s study
The second tool, a GIS-based
areas that most
promises to help managers take a more
model called BurnPro, enables
need fuel-reduction
nuanced view.
managers to estimate the annual
treatments.
In a subsequent study
probability of burning in a given
(JFSP 04-2-1-110), Miller and her
landscape. Fire risks and benefits can
colleagues are modeling the behavior of past WFUbe calculated by overlaying BurnPro output with firesuitable fires that were suppressed, reconstructing them
effects maps created by FEPF. The enhanced maps
as if they had been allowed to burn. “It’s a Mondayhelp managers identify those areas that most need
morning-quarterback way of assessing progress, or
fuel-reduction treatments. They also help them weigh
lack thereof,” she says. “We ask where specific WFU
the risks and benefits of various treatment options over
candidates would have spread if we hadn’t suppressed
both the short and the long term.
them.” Results from this study will supplement the
In the course of developing these tools, Black
fire-regime analysis that managers are already doing,
and her collaborators embarked on an intensive
enabling them to better quantify the costs and benefits
technology-transfer program. “We recognized that
of managing a fire for WFU.
success goes beyond achieving recognition and
adoption by a few research-minded managers,” she
Decision support tools
writes. “Success required institutionalization of the
knowledge and models.” The team’s outreach program
Managers also need to quantify the tradeoffs of
included determining managers’ needs early in the
wildland fire use at landscape scales, so they can
development process, enlisting managers as partners in
make well-calculated decisions about when and where
developing the planning tools, and providing ongoing
to apply it. There are several good planning and
support for users. In a subsequent JFSP-funded project
modeling tools available. Fire-behavior models such
(JFSP 05-4-1-20), Black and her colleagues developed
as BEHAVE and FARSITE (developed at the Missoula
more and better ways to disseminate and teach these
Fire Sciences Laboratory by Patricia Andrews and
tools, including Internet outreach, workshops, and inMark Finney, respectively) can be combined with
person consultations.
accurate fuel maps to help managers make reasonable
predictions about the behavior of a WFU fire not only
Getting the public on your side
immediately after ignition, but throughout the weeks
and months it will burn.
One of the biggest public concerns about WFU
However, says Anne Black of the Aldo Leopold
is smoke. When a fire is suppressed, the smoke dies
Wilderness Research Institute, some of the planning
with it, but when it lingers on as a WFU fire, people
and decision-support tools available to managers tend
to focus on fire as an immediate, short-term risk at
the stand level, rather than an unfolding long-term
ecological benefit at the landscape level. Thus,
they don’t support WFU as well as they might.
In a JFSP-funded effort to fill that gap
(JFSP 99-1-3-16), Black and her collaborators,
including Carol Miller, developed two tools to help
managers weigh the risks and benefits of various
treatment options, including WFU, over both the short
and long term. The first tool, Fire Effects Planning
Framework (FEPF), is a “meta-model” that links
publicly available analysis tools, data, and knowledge
to generate information for planning at a variety of
spatial and temporal scales. FEPF guides managers
A mixed hardwood forest burns in a WFU fire on Sulphur
in systematically mapping and quantifying the likely
Mountain, Arkansas.
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have to live with the smoke until autumn rains put the
many examples. The Forest Service’s Tim Sexton is
fire out. The smoke can add to already-polluted skies,
optimistic about recent progress in applying WFU to
potentially pushing them over Federal thresholds for
a broader range of landscapes. “We’ve made great
air quality. (Sometimes a good potential WFU ignition
strides in the past 5 years,” he says. “We were at 40
has to be suppressed, says van Wagtendonk, because
million acres [about 16 million hectares available for
air-quality authorities have determined that the smoke
WFU] in 2003, and we’re now at 60 million acres. And
would raise air-pollution levels past legal limits.)
every year more acres become available through land
Several JFSP-funded studies have addressed
management plan revisions.”
different aspects of smoke management, including
He is constantly prodding managers in every
improving the reliability of models that forecast
Forest Service region to increase WFU acres
wind patterns, estimating how much smoke a fire
burned. “My goal is not to have anywhere in the 200
will produce, tracking the spatial patterns of smoke
million acres of Forest Service lands where WFU
dispersal, and improving estimates of the contribution
is prohibited,” he says. “That doesn’t mean every
of WFU fires to regional air pollution.
fire will be managed as a WFU fire. But if WFU is
Studies now in progress include improvements
allowed on every acre we manage, then there’ll be no
to the BlueSky smoke model to provide real-time
restrictions on a local manager taking that strategy
predictions of surface smoke from fires, both wild
should the opportunity arise.”
and manager-ignited. Narasimhan Larkin of the
Bob Mutch cautions that “One size does not fit
Forest Service Pacific Northwest Research Station
all” when it comes to WFU. It’s most appropriate
is measuring smoke produced by WFU fires and
for large expanses of land that can accommodate
comparing the measurements with predictions from
a spreading fire without undesired side effects. In
BlueSky to improve the model’s predictive capability
smaller landscapes, he says, the needed treatment is
(JFSP 06-1-1-12). WFU fires are good for this kind
often better accomplished through prescribed burning
of study, he notes, because they burn for a long time,
rather than WFU.
producing a lot of smoke and a lot of data.
In sum, through practice, research, and continuous
In another study (JFSP 08-1-6-09), Shawn
learning, WFU is becoming a viable alternative
Urbanski of the Forest Service Rocky Mountain
to the blanket paradigm of wildfire suppression.
Research Station is using both a ground-based LIDAR
Concurrently, as fuels build up, as firefighting becomes
and airborne instruments to measure the composition
more expensive, and as firefighters continue to be sent
and movement of smoke plumes from wildland fires
into harm’s way, the reflex to suppress all wildfires is
over 3 years. Results will help improve
being increasingly challenged. “We can
the accuracy of smoke-plume models.
keep pouring money on large fires if
It may feel safer to
we want,” says the Park Service’s Tom
put the fire out now.
A broader range of
Nichols, “But we have to think in terms
But
that
just
means
of the future. It may feel safer to put
landscapes
the fire out now. But that just means
someone else will
The ecological benefits of fire are
someone else will inherit the problem
inherit the problem
well known, and the fuel-treatment
down the road.”
down the road.
benefits of WFU are documented by

The Warm Fire, Kaibab National Forest, Arizona, 2006.
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